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My only criticism of On Tactics is
that some of the selected essays veer
into areas that could more aptly be
described as “strategy” or “enterprise
management.” For example, “Toward
a New Identity” chronicles Admiral
Luce’s struggle to keep the Atlantic fleet
together long enough to test the tactical
doctrines flowing out of the recently
founded Naval War College. Although
this is a fine essay, it does not provide
the reader with any particular insight
into tactics. Rather, it provides insight
into why new tactics can be difficult to
develop. Similarly, “Creating ASW Killing Zones,” although an excellent piece
on Cold War antisubmarine warfare
operations and strategy, does not provide much in the way of tactical insights
on how to defeat the submarine threat.
The great advantage of this book, and
indeed the entire Wheel Books series, is
that it makes many excellent articles and
essays readily available to the reading
public—essays that might otherwise
have fallen by the wayside. Overall,
this volume is an excellent addition to
any personal library. The size of the
book and length of the articles make
it an excellent work for professional
development, wardroom discussion,
and thought-provoking conversation.
CHARLES H. LEWIS

Wachman, Alan M. Why Taiwan? Geostrategic
Rationales for China’s Territorial Integrity. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2007. 272pp.
$25.95

Tufts Fletcher School professor Alan
Wachman was a giant in the China, East
Asian studies, and international relations field who remains sorely missed
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following his untimely death in 2012.
In what is widely considered one of his
major scholarly contributions, through
this pithy, well-researched book—rightly
considered a classic—Wachman engages
in exceptional interdisciplinary analysis
to offer provocative coverage of historical episodes that have shaped Taiwan’s
status fundamentally. Some events raise
penetrating questions about what might
have resulted had they ended differently;
other factors inspire critical questions
about East Asia’s future. Wachman develops a theme of the strategic salience
of “imagined geography” as the best
explanation for the significant variation
over time in the association of Taiwan
as part of Chinese sovereign territory
in the minds of the leaders, and even
the populace, of mainland China. He
does so through close examination of
key Chinese documents and terminology as well as careful consideration of
their relative authority and reliability.
Wachman suggests that Sun Yat-sen,
Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong, and even
possibly Deng Xiaoping did not initially
consider Taiwan to be part of China in
the sense that it is understood officially
today. This approach raises compelling
questions about state formation and
national identity that are critical to the
understanding of international relations.
Indeed, it may be argued that “imagined
geography” is a global phenomenon and
hardly peculiar to China. It is important
to remember that Taiwan was formally
incorporated into Qing administration
in 1683, nearly a century before the
founding of the United States. One may
contrast such historical events as the
American acquisition and incorporation of Hawaii and Alaska and conclude
that the factors Wachman considers do
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not negate mainland China’s sovereignty
claim to Taiwan. Rather, it is primarily concerned for the maintenance of
Taiwan’s democracy and the freedoms
of its citizens that continue to inspire
Washington’s involvement long after
the Carter administration abrogated
the United States–Republic of China
Mutual Security Treaty in 1980.
While Wachman clearly documents
Taiwan’s strategic salience (real and
perceived), other factors may be important as well. An alternative explanation
might consider the challenge of Taiwan
as a separate polity (e.g., democratic
system). The vast majority of the other
“lost territories” to which Wachman
compares Taiwan have never been
separate polities; the few that have been
have not persisted for significant periods
of time. Hence, political salience may
be an appropriate variable. In fact, the
challenge of Taiwan as a separate polity
has emerged periodically throughout
history (e.g., through Dutch occupation,
Qing dynasty separatism under Ming
loyalist Zheng Chenggong, Japanese
imperialism, Nationalist rule, and
today’s multiparty democracy). China’s
imperial rulers initially viewed Taiwan
as a remote, politically unorganized
hinterland. Subsequently, however,
as alternative political systems were
imposed or developed on it with identities and objectives potentially at odds
with those of Beijing, it periodically
assumed heightened importance. This
has geographic underpinnings in the
sense that physical location rendered
Taiwan susceptible to both influence and
conquest by foreign maritime powers
and later to technological acquisition,
trade, and the attainment of per capita
gross domestic product at levels that
the vast majority of political scientists
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agree are conducive to the development of a democratic political system.
But the Taiwan question has been, and
remains to this day, a fundamentally
political one. While Taiwan’s geography
has not changed, its political identity has
varied tremendously. Since the end of
the Cold War, U.S. support for Taiwan
has arguably hinged on its rapidly liberalized political system, not its geostrategic significance. Taiwan is fundamentally useful in a geostrategic sense
primarily for the basing of capabilities
to facilitate its own defense. While some
U.S. policy makers no doubt see geostrategic benefits to the island’s present
status even today, it is difficult to imagine Washington being willing to risk the
expenditure of increasing amounts of
blood and treasure if and when Taiwan’s
democratic system is no longer at stake.
Should the day come when a majority of Taiwan’s populace favors formal
unification with the mainland—and
this popular will is expressed through
a transparent democratic process with
no external coercion—it is inconceivable that Washington could actively
oppose such a transition on geostrategic
grounds. There is, however, the disturbing possibility that even if Washington’s
policy toward Taipei is not fundamentally geostrategic in motivation, policy advocated by elements of China’s government (particularly the military) may be.
Wachman does acknowledge related
complexities and the difficulty of finding
conclusive evidence for his geostrategic
explanation. However one may view
these sensitive issues—which remain
hotly contested—Wachman has made a
valuable contribution on a critical issue
whose complex history and enduring
significance are forgotten at the peril of
all in the Asia-Pacific. The complexities
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Wachman introduces provide important
considerations for the continuing debate
over Taiwan’s future. Those fortunate
enough to have known Wachman
personally know what a fine friend and
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colleague he was; all can benefit from
his intellectual legacy, of which this
book is an important, enduring part.
ANDREW S. ERICKSON
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